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ADMITTING COMPUTER RECORD EVIDENCE AFTER IN RE VINHNEE: A STRICTER STANDARD FOR THE FUTURE?
Cooper Offenbecher1
©2007 Cooper Offenbecher
Abstract
In re Vinhnee, a Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision, employed Edward Imwinkelried’s eleven-step foundation
process for authenticating computer records. In employing the eleven-step process, the Vinhnee court articulated a stricter
standard than has previously been used by most courts for admitting computer records into evidence. This Article will first
consider the various foundation standards that courts have applied to computer records. Next, the Article will analyze the
Vinhnee standard, consider its elements, and compare it to the previous standards and commentary. Finally, the Article will
conclude that the Vinhnee approach reflects common concerns by courts and commentators, and may influence other
jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>In 2005, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit issued In re Vinhnee, a decision that adopted a
newer, stricter standard for the authentication of computer records.2  The court adopted an eleven-step foundation process,
advocated for by Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried3  , and refused to admit computer records in a bankruptcy proceeding.4  In light
of Imwinkelried’s process, the court stated that the witness’ knowledge of the hardware and software used by the company was
insufficient to prove that the computer records were reliable.5  The opinion marked a serious departure from the previous foundation
standard employed by courts for the authentication of computer records.
<2>Today, it is hard to find records and information that are not stored on computers in some form. In our increasingly
technologically-oriented society, computers are being used for a broad range of functions in everyday life and business. A large
majority of information that was previously calculated and stored on paper now exists exclusively on computers.6  As a result,
computer records are becoming an increasingly important part of litigation.7  Complex commercial litigation, health care fraud
prosecutions8  , white-collar crime, and bankruptcy proceedings are legal fields that frequently involve computer records as
evidence. The admission or exclusion of computer records into evidence can be crucial to winning — or losing — an important case.
As computers have become more prevalent and widely accepted, the theoretical question for legal scholars, lawyers, and judges
9
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alike, has been: Should courts infer reliability and trustworthiness from computer records?  However, because the majority of
computer records are reliable and authentic, at a more practical level the inquiry is: Through how many hoops should courts require
the institutional record keeper to jump?
<3> This Article will consider the various standards that have been employed by courts for admitting computer records. Though
evidence of all types is found on computers, this Article will primarily consider business records.10  The Article will then analyze
Vinhnee and will consider whether the standard applied by the court is too strict. Ultimately, the Article will conclude that the
Vinhnee standard is an accurate reflection of the concerns of courts and legal scholars, and may influence the law in other
jurisdictions.
HISTORY OF COMPUTER RECORD ADMISSION
<4>Today’s lawyers rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), commonly referred to as the “business records exception” to the
hearsay rule, as a way to admit business records, including those kept on computers, into evidence.11  The Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE), however, were only adopted in 1975.12  Prior to the national codification of the rules of evidence, a similar business
record exception to the hearsay doctrine was recognized at common law due to necessity and reliance.13  The basic premise behind
the “shop-book” rule (as it was called) was the importance of business records in litigation and the overwhelming expense and
burden on judicial resources that would ensue if parties were required to call as a witness every person who had made an entry in a
business ledger.14  Business records have been considered generally reliable because of the day-to-day reliance that businesses
place on the records.15
<5>As computers became more frequently used as a means of storing business records, and computer records began playing an
important role in litigation, federal courts took different approaches to the presumptive reliability of computer records. One approach
was to consider the authenticity of business records on a computer as “immaterial”, and to treat the records as if they had been
kept on paper.16  One court even went so far as to give computer printouts produced in the course of business at least a prima
facie aura of reliability.17  Another approach was more cautious, and called for a more careful and detailed foundation concerning
the computer systems that produced the records.18
Authentication and Rule 901
<6>Rule 901(a) is the general authentication requirement under the FRE.19  Rule 901(b) offers, “by way of illustration only”,
examples of authentication or identification that conform with the requirements of Rule 901.20  Rule 901(b)(9) states that
“[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate
result” is required to authenticate evidence.21  The FRE Advisory Committee’s note explains that this rule can be properly applied to
computer records.22  However, many courts have not required specific authentication procedures under 901(b)(9) for business
records that have simply been kept on a computer.23  Rather, some courts have only required specific authentication under
901(b)(9) when the computer system or process has produced a compilation or analysis specifically for trial.24  As a result, Rule
901(b)(9) is often not considered by courts when the issue is merely the introduction of computer printouts of business records.
The 803(6) Foundation
<7>When the FRE were enacted, Rule 803(6) codified the shop-book rule as the hearsay exception for “Records of Regularly
Conducted Activity.”25  The rule permits the admission of records made by a person with knowledge and kept in the regular course
of a generally conducted business activity unless the source of information or method of preparation indicates a lack of
trustworthiness.26  While different courts have organized the process and the wording of the steps differently, the traditional
foundation for business records under 803(6) requires that the records be:
1. Made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge;
2
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2. Made pursuant to a regular practice of the business activity;
3. Kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity; and
4. The source, method, or circumstances of preparation must not indicate lack of trustworthiness.27
<8>After initially adopting the FRE, courts largely treated computer records as presumptively trustworthy and did not require any
special foundation to be laid for the authenticity of the records.28  The Ninth Circuit itself treated the “trustworthiness” caveat of
803(6) as an implied authenticity requirement, and considered computer records authentic absent a showing that the records were
untrustworthy.29  This practice essentially shifted the burden of disproving the authenticity of the records to the opponent — if there
was no evidence that the records were untrustworthy, then they were admitted. Many courts today still consider the text of 803(6)
to “effectively incorporate an authentication requirement”.30
Shifting the Burden: The Manual for Complex Litigation
<9>The Manual for Complex Litigation (“Manual”) was one of the first secondary sources of authority to encourage courts to shift the
burden of the authenticity question to the proponent of the records to show that the printouts were in fact what they purported to
be. Imwinkelried cites the Manual as one of the main reasons some courts have required a more detailed foundation for computer
records over the years.31  In its 1982 edition, the Manual recommended that, well in advance of trial, courts require that:
1. The offering party demonstrate that the input procedures conform to the standard practice of persons engaged in the
business or profession of the party or person from whom the printout is obtained
2. In the case of a printout prepared especially for trial, the offering party demonstrate that the person from whom the
printout is obtained relied on the data base in making a business or professional judgment within a reasonably short
period of time before producing the printout sought to be introduced
3. The offering party provide expert testimony that the processing program reliably and accurately processes the data in
the data base; and
4. The opposing party be given the opportunity to depose the offeror’s witness and to engage a witness of its own to
evaluate the processing procedure.32
<10>These four recommendations put a much higher burden on the offering party to demonstrate the reliability of the computer
processing procedure before the trial even began. For instance, requiring expert testimony about the processing program involves
expenditure of a substantial amount of resources on the part of the parties and the courts. The Manual stopped short of
recommending those four steps as the actual foundation process for computer records. Rather, the Manual stated broadly that
courts should ensure that the proper foundation for computer records has been laid to avoid risk of procedural errors or
falsification.33  The Manual referenced a case where the court required the proponent to lay a more comprehensive foundation,
specifically requiring testimony about the frequency of the testing of the computer programs as well as specifics about the
program’s reliability and accuracy.34
<11>One commentator read the Manual as proposing a new four-step foundation process, and strongly encouraged courts to adopt
the process, in which the proponent was required to prove that (1) the document is a business record; (2) the document has
probative value; (3) the computer equipment used is reliable; and (4) reliable data processing techniques were applied.35  Most
courts, however, did not adopt a stricter foundation standard, and continued to admit computer records under the traditional 803(6)
foundation.36  Any inquiry into the authenticity of the records was done under the auspices of the “lack of trustworthiness” caveat of
the rule.37
<12>While subsequent editions of the Manual took a more lenient approach to the authentication of computer records, the most
recent annotated edition suggests stricter recommendations, even citing Vinhnee itself. After 1982, the Manual took an increasingly
hands-off approach to the authentication of computer records. In its 1985 edition, the Manual explicitly stated that “the proponent
3
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of computerized evidence has the burden of laying a proper foundation by establishing its accuracy.”38  However, the Manual did not
recommend a specific foundation process or even cite to example cases as it did in the earlier edition. Rather, in a footnote, the
Manual explains that the proponent need not prove the data is free from all error and must merely “be sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”39  After that standard is met, the trier of fact may weigh the evidence
based on its own perception of reliability and accuracy. In its 2005 edition, the Manual stated simply that computerized data
“raise[s] unique issues concerning accuracy and authenticity,” and broadly advised judges to consider the accuracy and reliability of
computerized data without making any specific recommendations regarding the foundation process.40  However, the 2007 annotated
edition actually cited the opinion in Vinhnee, noting the importance of inquiring into the policies and procedures for the use of the
computer equipment, the control of access to computer programs, and the structure and implementation of backup systems and
audit procedures for assuring the continuing integrity of the database.41
Imwinkelried’s Eleven-Step Foundation Process
<13>Some commentators and scholars have long advocated for a more detailed foundation process for computer records. Edward J.
Imwinkelried’s Evidentiary Foundations provided an eleven-step foundation process for the authentication of computer records when
it was first published in 1980.42  In subsequent editions, Imwinkelried references scholarship on computer record authentication,
including the Manual, explaining that many courts have “been lax in applying the authentication requirement to computer records”
and have simply applied the traditional 803(6) foundation.43  Imwinkelried’s process requires the proponent to show that:
(1) The business uses a computer.
(2) The computer is reliable.
(3) The business has developed a procedure for inserting data into the computer.
(4) The procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors.
(5) The business keeps the computer in a good state of repair.
(6) The witness had the computer readout certain data.
(7) The witness used the proper procedures to obtain the readout.
(8) The computer was in working order at the time the witness obtained the readout.
(9) The witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout.
(10) The witness explains how he or she recognizes the readout.
(11) If the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the witness explains the meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of
fact.44
Still, a higher level of scrutiny and a formalized foundation process had not been wholly endorsed by any court on a regular basis.
IN RE VINHNEE
<14>In re Vee Vinhnee began as a bankruptcy proceeding when Vee Vinhnee filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case.45  Mr. Vinhnee owed
a large amount of money to American Express based on two credit cards.46  American Express filed an adversary proceeding seeking
to have over $41,000 of the debt excepted from discharge. While Vinhnee himself did not actually appear for trial, the court
nonetheless conducted the trial and required American Express to present evidence.47  American Express called a witness who
identified himself as the custodian of records for the monthly statements and laid the foundation for the records under the
traditional 803(6) method.48  The court was not satisfied with the witness’ knowledge of the hardware and software used to produce
and store the information, and refused to admit the records into evidence, even after American Express was afforded the
opportunity to make a post-trial supplementary submission.49
4
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<15>The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the records and further articulated the
necessity of laying a careful and detailed foundation for computer records: “The paperless electronic record involves a difference in
the format of the record that presents more complicated variations on the authentication problem than for paper records.”50  The
court cited Imwinkelried’s eleven-step foundation process as “the prism” through which to view the computer records.51  The court
specifically noted that the complexity of “ever-developing computer technology” requires careful attention to ensure that the
document offered in court is the same record that was originally created on the computer.52  Technological processes such as those
that allow one to alter the text of documents, the court explained, necessitate the need for a new, more in-depth foundation.53
Vinhnee also cited The Manual for Complex Litigation as well as other contemporary commentators who have highlighted the need to
protect, and inquire into, the integrity of electronic documents.54
<16>The Appellate Panel gave credence to the lower court’s ruling, but more importantly, it supported the decision with references
to commentators, trends in the law, and Imwinkelried’s eleven-step process. By essentially adopting Imwinkelried’s eleven-step
process, the court gave basis and precedent to the lower court’s disapproval of the custodian’s lack of familiarity with the hardware
and software.
IS THE STANDARD TOO STRICT?
<17>Vinhnee breaks new ground in establishing a standard for authenticating business records. The court explained that early
versions of computer foundations were too brief, even though the basic elements purportedly covered foundation under 803(6).55
The custodian of records testified to the requirements for foundation under Rule 803(6), but the court still excluded the records.56
Under the traditional 803(6) standard, the records would presumably have been admitted.
<18>Legal scholars are certainly noting the increasing importance of computer records in litigation and the reality that there can be
serious reliability problems concerning computer records.57  Errors can occur when inputting information into the computer, when
the computer is processing the information, and when accessing or retrieving the information from the computer.58  Increasing
incidences of identity theft, 59  for example, highlight the vulnerability of information stored on computers. But despite the calls
from commentators and scholars, many courts (the Vinhnee court excepted) seem to have relaxed the rules on authentication and
are in fact treating computer records as self-authenticating.60  Some commentators have decided to go along with the courts and
have concluded that the current rules of evidence and foundational processes are adequate, and that any questions about the
authenticity of the evidence should affect the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility.61  Others have stated, however, like
Imwinkelried and the Manual, that the presumption of reliability employed by some courts unfairly puts the burden on the opposing
party to object to the authenticity.62  Indeed, such a presumption requires the opposing party to have detailed, affirmative
knowledge about the computer systems. In these cases, however, the proponent is often the only party with access to the
computer systems; the opposing party, conversely, usually lacks sufficient access to investigate potential sources of error. In today’s
fast-paced technological world, requiring the opponent to object to computer evidence likely puts an undue burden on the opposing
party.63  As a result, some argue that the 803(6) foundation does not satisfy the basic authentication requirements of Rule 901(a),
and that computer records always need to be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(9).64  The method employed by Vinhnee incorporates
many of these criticisms. It essentially puts the burden on the party offering the evidence to affirmatively demonstrate, through an
eleven-step foundation process, that the offered record is in fact an accurate reflection of the information or record it purports to
be.
<19>The Imwinkelried eleven-step process seems long and daunting. But some of the steps are cursory foundation steps that most
witnesses who are prepared to authenticate computer records under the traditional Rule 803(6) process would be able to handle
anyway. Steps four, five, and eleven are the steps that are most likely to give witnesses trouble. Step four requires that the witness
testify that, “[t]he procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors.”65  This step presumably requires the
witness to understand internal processes of the hardware and software. Step five states that “the business keeps the computer in a
good state of repair.”66  Most witnesses would likely be able to testify to the external physical state of the computer. However, to
the extent that courts may interpret this step to require knowledge of the internal state of repair (perhaps requiring knowledge of
the extent and frequency of virus scans and software maintenance and upgrades), the step may require knowledge beyond that
5
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known to a witness who is only prepared for the 803(6) foundation. The eleventh step states that “if the readout contains strange
symbols or terms, the witness explains the meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of fact.”67
<20>The Vinhnee court seemed most concerned with the witness’ knowledge of specifics regarding accuracy, security, and the
potential for data error or loss. “There is no information regarding American Express’ computer policy and system control
procedures, including control of access to pertinent databases, control of access to pertinent programs, recording and logging of
changes to the data, backup practices, and audit procedures utilized to assure the continuing integrity of the records.”68  In doing
so, the court highlights step four and step five (to the extent that it deals with the internal processes of the computer) as two of the
most important foundation steps.
<21>It is difficult to know whether testimony in older cases would be sufficient to meet the Vinhnee standard since it is impossible
to tell if witnesses in those cases knew more about the computer systems than their testimony demonstrated. In U.S. v. Linn, the
defendant sought to exclude a computer printout of hotel phone records.69  At trial, the records were admitted into evidence
through Ms. Fry, the hotel’s “Director of Communications.”70  The defendant argued that Ms. Fry was not a qualified foundation
witness because she did not know how the computer printout was generated: she “did not understand the distinctions between
‘menus’, ‘data bases’, and computer ‘code’” and was thus “confused and inadequately trained.”71  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
dismissed the argument as “frivolous” and held the record properly admitted, stating that the record was generated automatically
and that the phone record was retained in the ordinary course of business.72  The Vinhnee court, however, might not have been as
forgiving. Here, it is unclear whether Ms. Fry would have been able to testify regarding the “built-in safeguards” step required of the
Imwinkelried eleven-step process. However, her lack of knowledge concerning the differences between menus, data bases, and code
suggests that she might not have been able to provide the affirmative information concerning the reliability of the computer system
that Vinhnee requires. We also know that if Ms. Fry had been unable to specifically identify the types of hardware and software used
by the company, the Vinhnee court would certainly have taken note, as it deemed “unpersuasive” the testimony of the American
Express custodian who could not do the same.73  One can only imagine that there have been scores of custodians who have laid the
foundation for computer records but would not have been able to state the types of hardware and software used in keeping or
creating the records.
<22>In adopting Imwinkelried’s standard, the Vinhnee court may have taken unnecessary steps to exclude the American Express
records in question. In footnotes, the court quotes from the testimony of the custodian of records as evidence for the court’s
conclusion that the custodian’s assertions indicated lack of knowledge and were unpersuasive.74  The records custodian did not know
the model of the computer system, whether the software was accounting software or billing software, and generally exhibited a
complete lack of knowledge about the computer system.75  While these facts are not part of Imwinkelried’s process, they comprise a
basic set of facts that most computer records custodians should possess. Had the custodian been able to recite the requested facts,
the court might have accepted his conclusions regarding the reliability of the computer systems.
<23>Regardless of what reasons the court actually had for excluding the records, it explicitly adopted the Imwinkelried “prism” as
the court’s means for evaluating the foundation.76  In doing so, it rejected the sufficiency of the traditional Rule 803(6) foundation
as self-authenticating and implicitly renewed the need to affirmatively authenticate computer records. The Vinhnee court’s emphasis
on reliability, accuracy, and system knowledge is consistent with urgings by the Manual and some scholars. Though it employs an
eleven-step foundation process that has not previously been cited by courts, the key inquiries are into accuracy and reliability.
These issues are not new and are the crux of traditional authentication inquiries in all areas of evidence. Imwinkelried’s foundation
process has been in circulation since 1980 and his Evidentiary Foundations book is a widely employed trial tool. In its essence, the
Imwinkelried foundation is a well-articulated inquiry into accuracy and reliability. The Vinhnee approach is not, by nature, an outlier.
It reflects a long-standing desire by some to inquire into the accuracy and reliability of computer records. While other courts may
not immediately follow Vinhnee, the decision is unlikely to be eschewed as requiring unrealistic, exacting knowledge of records
custodians.77  The case may influence other judges who are similarly dissatisfied with the lack of knowledge of testifying
witnesses.78
CONCLUSION
<24>The Vinhnee standard is a well-articulated inquiry into the accuracy and reliability of computer records. The standard accurately
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reflects the urging of commentators to require a more detailed inquiry into authenticity. The eleven-step process is, in reality, not
that different from what some courts employ in practice. Still, many judges may be unwilling to adopt the new standard and expend
judicial resources to exclude evidence, hear appeals, and retry cases. However, the Vinhnee court marks an important step in the
evolution of the comfort levels of courts with computer records. And while some litigators and witnesses may not be ready to
produce the type of knowledge required to authenticate under the Vinhnee standard, they would be wise to take notice of this case
as some courts are likely to begin requiring a more detailed foundation than Rule 803(6) requires on its face.
PRACTICE POINTERS
Businesses should have a designated “custodian of records” who knows the specifications of the hardware and software
systems, processes for entering and extracting data from the computer, and the safeguards for accuracy and reliability.
Witnesses who are called to authenticate computer records should be prepared to lay the Vinhnee/Imwinkelried
foundation. There is generally no harm in laying too much foundation.
<< Top
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